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In this paper we focus on the participation stage and analyze what kinds of firms that are 
granted access to the 5 most important technology programs in Norway. Based upon a 
combination of logistic regression and factor analysis we find that the public support system 
for R&D in Norway is built around export oriented, innovative and larger firms. Technology 
programs support these firms with “research” and “development” subsidies in order to support 
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Introduction 
Research and development (R&D) policy interventions have traditionally been “justified” by 
market failure arguments. The market failure argument developed by Arrow (1962) and others 
states that due to market imperfections, such as incomplete appropriability and spillovers, 
firms can not reap the full benefits of innovative activities. As a result, firms will invest less 
than the socially optimum in R&D activities (Arrow, 1962; for a recent discussion see 
Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). Following this argument a large theoretical and empirical literature 
argues that firms left on their own face insufficient incentives to invest in R&D from the point 
of view of society (Hall, 2002). 
 
Contemporary innovation policies are to a large extent based upon this reasoning. Public 
R&D programs have been designed to support commercial R&D projects with large expected 
social benefits but with inadequate expected returns to private investors (Klette et al, 2000). 
Studies have on the other hand shown that knowledge developed by rival firms is not costless 
to imitate (Levin et al, 1987). This reduces the incomplete appropriability and spillover 
problem for R&D doing firms, but does not eliminate the under-investment problem (Hall, 
2002). Capital market imperfections are believed to exist in the sense that there is a wedge 
between the private rate of return required by a firm investing own funds in a R&D project, 
and the rate of return required by external investors (Hall, 2002). If firms are not already 
wealthy, or profitable, some innovations will not be developed because the cost of external 
capital is too high. Such “funding problems” justify R&D policy interventions. Supporting 
young, small and cash-constrained firms in the context of R&D and innovation is 
recommended (Hall, 2002).      
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There is little disagreement about the desirability of subsidizing private R&D activities among 
researchers and policymakers (Klette et al, 2000). Many researchers and policymakers have 
on the other hand grown frustrated with the lack of statistical evidence documenting a direct 
contribution from public R&D financing (David et al, 2000). This “frustration” has led to a 
rapid increase in the number of studies where the goal is to evaluate whether R&D subsidies 
stimulate or substitute private R&D spending. The empirical evidence has been mixed (see 
David et al, 2000 for a review of the “older” literature).  Most recent studies seem to conclude 
that R&D subsidies are in fact capable of inducing additional R&D efforts at the firm level 
(see Hall, 2005; Aerts et al, 2006 for reviews of this literature). What these recent “effect 
studies” have in common is that differences between R&D programs are left unexplored.  
 
To what extent are R&D programs designed differently? Do technology programs support 
different kinds of firms? If technology programs are different when it comes to the selection 
rules used to fund firms and projects, heterogeneous selection rules at the level of technology 
programs can lead to different outcomes among subsidized firms (Heijs, 2003; Blanes & 
Busom, 2004). It is recognized that R&D policies consist of a mix of different technology 
programs (Mytelka & Smith, 2002; Luukonen, 2000; Georghiou & Roessner, 2000).  Prior 
research has on the other hand not explored to what extent major technology programs within 
a country are different from one another. Less is known about the actual combination of 
technology programs firms use and whether firms are supported by several R&D programs 
simultaneously. We will shed some empirical light on these questions in this paper.  
 
We will evaluate how subsidies from the most important R&D programs within a National 
System of Innovation (NIS) are allocated among firms and projects in order to identity 
patterns of policy practice. Both R&D subsidies and policy objectives are taxonomized.   3
According to reviews of the literature it is an important avenue for further research to use 
taxonomies in econometric evaluations in order to understand how R&D programs differ, and 
whether the heterogeneity among technology programs can be related to outcomes (David & 
Hall, 2000). Taxonomic evaluations are further justified by the high and recent policy interest 
in finding some “R&D program design” that encourages additional spending on innovative 
activities in the private sector (Aerts et al, 2006).   
 
We respond to these shortcomings in the following way.  We will first analyze what kind of 
firm characteristics that can predict participation status in the 5 most important technology 
programs in Norway. A focus upon the participation stage will reveal whether R&D programs 
use different selection rules when they allocate R&D subsidies to firms. We will secondly 
analyze what kinds of firms that access several technology programs at the same time. Our 
third objective is to refine and develop a taxonomy where R&D programs in Norway are 
classified according to whether they distribute “research” or “development” subsidies to 
firms. The paper ends with a discussion of whether the observed policy practise is consistent 
with innovation policy goals.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we will discuss why it is important to 
focus on the participation stage. This is followed by a discussion of what kinds of firms that 
are believed to access technology programs, in section 3. Features of the Norwegian support 
system are discussed in section 4 in relation to Norway’s adoption of the Lisbon Agenda. The 
technology program taxonomy is also discussed in that section. The methodology and data are 
discussed in section 5. The empirical analysis is conducted in section 6 where we estimate 
what kind of firms that are most likely to be subsidized from the most important R&D   4
programs in Norway. The analysis is accompanied by a discussion of the results. Concluding 
remarks are presented in section 7.  
 
R&D program participation and innovation policy 
It is important for both innovation policy and theory to focus on what kinds of firms that 
participate in R&D programs. A program participation focus can reveal the existence of 
unexpected barriers to “entry” into technology programs for some types of firms (Blanes & 
Busom, 2004). Technology programs can fail to support eligible firms.  This can have 
consequences for what kind of effects subsidies have upon private R&D spending and the 
economic performance of recipient firms at a later stage. This will in turn have implications 
for innovation policy. By focusing on the participation stage we can identify how innovation 
policies are implemented in practice. The public support system for private R&D is a defining 
feature of the national system of innovation. Public provision of R&D funding is an inherently 
important part of most innovation policies. To identify the allocation and selection rules the 
most important R&D programs use can help us in detecting how R&D policies are 
implemented, whether subsidies are allocated to the intended business population, and to 
correctly interpret differences in observed behaviour and outcomes among subsidized firms. 
This last point is important for studies of the effectiveness of R&D subsidies. These studies 
have far too often neglected the existence of heterogeneity among R&D programs. Such 
heterogeneity can explain why some studies report that subsides stimulate private R&D 
spending, while others do not (see discussion in David et al, 2000; David & Hall, 2000; Aerts 
et al, 2006). Only when R&D programs are allowed to differ in impact evaluations is it 
possible to identify good policy practice with respect to the implementation of technology 
policies.  
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According to contemporary innovation policies such as the Lisbon Agenda – which Norway 
to a large extent follows – policymakers should facilitate innovation in the private sector by 
improving innovation support services, provide better access to finance for firms, especially 
SMEs, and create a supportive environment which strengthens the innovation potential of 
firms (NHD, 2006). A focus on the participation stage is an important first step in order to 
analyze whether policy practice is consistent with innovation policy goals. This is also a 
necessary first step in most R&D policy evaluations. Hence, a focus on what kind of firms 
that participate in the most important R&D programs within a country can enhance our 
understanding of how vital aspects of the national innovation and public support system 
interacts with the firm level. 
 
It has been shown that a substantial proportion of subsidized firms have a free-riding 
behaviour towards the public support system (Heijs, 2003). The percentage of free-riders, 
understood as subsidized firms whose innovation projects do not depend upon public funding, 
were found to differ substantially between different types of R&D programs. This suggests 
that some R&D program designs are better at stimulating additional R&D efforts at the firm 
level compared to others. Recent reviews of the innovation systems literature (Edquist, 2005; 
Lundvall et al, 2002) have argued that it is important to better understand the relations 
between R&D activity at the firm level and institutional variables associated with the NIS. 
Analyzing what kinds of firms that are supported with different types of subsidies by the most 
important R&D programs in a national context can increase our understanding of such 
relations.  
 
It is recognized that R&D policies consist of a mix of different technology programs that use 
different policy tools in order to reach innovation policy goals (Mytelka & Smith, 2002;   6
Luukonen, 2000; Georghiou & Roessner, 2000). Despite this insight, we know less about how 
R&D programs differ, whether some types of firms are excluded from participation, and 
whether some types of firms are supported by several technology programs at the same time. 
Few studies have analyzed firm participation status across technology programs (Blanes & 
Busom, 2004). An obvious reason is, as always, lack of relevant data on R&D programs. The 
database we draw upon in this paper does not suffer from such shortcomings. Below we 
summarize and discuss what is known about the firm level determinants of participation status 
with respect to the allocation rules technology programs use when firms and projects are 
funded.  
 
Participation in technology programs: Firm factors and selection 
rules  
Participation in technology programs is an outcome of both firm factors and decisions taken 
by policymakers in R&D programs. Some firms are believed to be more capable of drafting a 
good application, or simply possess the necessary competence to join a R&D program. 
Technology programs can however reject applications, and selection can differ across R&D 
programs. Both firm factors – and the selection rule used by R&D programs – will determine 
whether a firm is subsidized or not.  
 
What kind of firms will apply for a subsidy? 
Policymakers can reduce the private cost of doing R&D by offering tax-credits or subsidies to 
firms (Hall, 2002; David et al, 2000). The existence of R&D policy interventions will have an 
impact on firms’ decision to embark upon innovation projects. According to the market 
failure argument subsidies should target areas where there is a large gap between the private – 
and the social – rate of return to R&D investments (Arrow, 1962). Subsidies can as such make   7
R&D projects profitable. Firms in this situation will have a strong motivation to apply in 
order to join a technology program. If the costs of applying are small, and the allocation 
criteria used by R&D programs are not very restrictive, most firms will have an incentive to 
apply for a subsidy. This is also the case for firms that do not need the subsidy in order to 
make the R&D project profitable (Blanes & Busom, 2004; Jaffe, 2002). Finally, the amount 
of the subsidy might be too small to make private R&D spending profitable. Firms in this 
situation are not expected to join a technology program. The decision to apply for 
participation status will as such differ across firms.  
 
Firm size and age 
The relationship between firm size and innovation is connected to the literature on the 
Schumpeterian Hypothesis (see Cohen & Levin, 1989; Cohen, 1995; Acs & Audretsch, 2003 
for reviews). A standard interpretation of this hypothesis is that innovative activities increase 
more than proportionally with firm size. An argument in favour of such an interpretation is 
the belief that smaller firms are unable to finance innovative activities, and as such, are less 
inclined to innovate. According to Hall (2002) small, start-up and cash-constrained firms face 
a higher cost of external capital than larger firms when they try to finance their innovation 
projects. Larger firms are in addition more likely to use internally generated funds in the R&D 
process. Hence, smaller, younger, and cash-constrained firms should be more inclined to 
apply and to be included in technology programs by policymakers. Most firms have on the 
other hand an incentive to reduce the private cost of doing R&D by applying for a subsidy 
(Blanes & Busom, 2004; Jaffe, 2002).  
 
Contrary to what one might expect, empirical evaluation studies suggest that larger firms are 
more likely to be subsidized. With the exception of Busom's (2000) study of a single R&D   8
program in Spain, prior research has found that larger and older firms are more likely to get 
access to public funding. Research from Germany (Hussinger, 2006; Czarnitzki & Fier, 2002; 
Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Czarnitzki & Hussinger, 2004), from France (Dugout, 2004), from 
Spain (Herrera & Heijs, 2004), from Belgium (Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004) and from the US 
(Wallsten, 2000), shows that larger size is positively related to the probability of being 
subsidized. Furthermore, empirical studies have reported that older firms are far more likely 
to get access to subsidies (Busom, 2000; Hussinger, 2006; Czarnitzki & Hussinger, 2004).  
 
According to a historical analysis of Norwegian R&D policy, economics of scale (size) and 
scope (diversification) have been important elements in public sector regulation of private 
R&D (Wicken, 2000). Large, R&D intensive, diversified and financially strong companies 
have been selectively targeted for public support since the 1950’s and onwards in Norway. 
This discussion suggests that larger, diversified and innovative firms are more likely to be 
subsidized.  
 
Group membership and diversification 
Economies of scope have been an important element in Norwegian R&D policy, as just 
discussed. Diversified firms are believed to be more innovative due to complementarities that 
arise from uniting knowledge and experience from two or more industries in the R&D and 
innovation process. According to Nelson (1959) only diversified firms will spend funds on 
basic R&D. The main reason is that the outcome from basic science discovery is highly 
unpredictable. Only product-diversified firms with “fingers in many pies” are likely to market 
and profit from the technological knowledge that follows from such search activity. 
Diversified firms can as such be more inclined to apply for a subsidy and expect to be 
supported by policymakers. Diversified firms and / or firms with a corporate parent can also   9
have a higher propensity to apply for a R&D subsidy because resources at the corporate level, 
such as information, expertise and funds, are made available to the applicant. However, two 
previous studies did not find group membership to be positively related to participation for 
Belgian and German firms (Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004; Czarnitzki & Hussinger, 2004). It 
remains to be seen whether this is the case also in Norway.  
   
Past- dependency of R&D and innovative activities 
Firms that have successfully innovated in the past have had the opportunity to selectively 
retain organizational routines that promote future R&D activities (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Aldrich, 1999).  Firms with established innovation capabilities are more inclined to keep 
doing R&D and to apply for public funding to finance this endeavour. Research has shown 
that firms with previous innovation activities, proxied by patents and R&D departments, are 
positively related to the probability of being subsidized (Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004; Blanes & 
Busom, 2004; Czarnitzki & Hussinger, 2004; Hussinger, 2006; Wallsten, 2000). Based upon 
these findings, and the historical analysis of Norwegian R&D policy (Wicken, 2000), we 
expect firms with innovation activities in the past to be more likely to apply for a R&D 
subsidy. 
  
Ownership and foreign capital  
According to Archibugi & Iammarino (1999) governments must make a choice about whether 
or not to give affiliates of foreign firms access to national R&D subsidies. The dividing line is 
believed to go between governments emphasizing ownership, and those who do not, in 
relation to the technological knowledge developed as a result of public R&D investments. 
While the United States seems to follow a policy where foreign firms can get access to 
subsidies (Archibugi & Iammarino, 1999), studies from several European countries show that   10
affiliates of foreign firms are likely to be excluded from R&D policies in the host country 
(Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Herrera & Heijs, 2004; Busom, 2000; Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004 
Hussinger, 2006). Affiliates of foreign owned companies may benefit from R&D developed 
in the home country of the mother company. Hence, foreign firms may face few incentives to 
engage in R&D activity in the host country. Innovative foreign firms can also be denied 
access to R&D subsidies in the host country. According to a historical analysis of Norwegian 
R&D policy, R&D has been seen by Norwegian policymakers as a major instrument in the 
industrialization of Norway. The major policy objective in this context has been to promote 
the development of R&D capabilities among Norwegian firms independent of the major 
foreign owned firms located in Norway, such as foreign owned oil companies. A policy 
response has accordingly been to selectively support and encourage R&D activities among 
national firms (Wicken, 2000). We will therefore expect foreign owned firms in Norway to be 
less likely to get a subsidy.  
   
Export and competitiveness 
Firms that export some, or all, of their products or services usually face strong international 
competition. These firms will have a major incentive to strengthen their competitiveness 
through innovation. With the exception of Busom’s (2000) study of a single R&D program in 
Spain, prior evaluation research has shown that exporting firms are more likely to get access 
to subsidies (Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004; Hussinger, 2006; 
Czarnitzki & Hussinger, 2004). Because Norway has a small and open economy where many 
firms export their goods, we expect R&D programs in Norway to be more inclined to support 
firms with more export revenues.    
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Industry and technological opportunity 
Industries vary in terms of technological opportunities and to the extent to which the 
economic value of innovations can be reaped (Klevorick et al, 1995; Levin et al 1987). Firms 
in certain industries can as such have a higher propensity to be engaged in innovative 
activities and to apply for a subsidy. According to Wicken’s (2000) historical analysis of 
Norwegian innovation policy, the public support system for R&D has traditionally supported 
certain industries over others in accordance with policy objectives to support strategic sectors 
(Wicken, 2000; Lundvall & Borrás, 2004). Recent policy initiatives suggest that the policy 
scope has been broadened and that subsidies are allocated to firms regardless of industrial 
affiliation (Wicken, 2000).  For this reason we do not expect industrial affiliation to be an 
important predictor variable.  
 
Financial characteristics, funding constraints and firm growth 
Firms with better cash-flow are believed to be more likely to divert resources into R&D 
activity (Klette & Møen, 1998). Because cash-flow is an approximation of the internal 
resources that can be used for R&D purposes, firms with better cash-flow should be less 
inclined to be subsidized. Cash-flow has however not been found to be a significant predictor 
of R&D subsidies in the empirical literature (Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004). Public agencies or 
R&D programs are further embedded in an institutional context where they fight over scarce 
resources. Program managers face strong pressures for high “success rates”, as politicians are 
unlikely to support programs where a lot of the projects “fail”.  This can lead to a situation 
where program managers decide to “pick the winners” and support commercially attractive 
project proposals and firms with already high growth rates (Aerts, et al, 2006; Wallsten, 
2000). 
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Selection criteria used by R&D programs 
Policymakers usually have a range of different objectives when they design R&D programs. 
These objectives will determine the total budget allocated to specific programs, the 
distribution of money across industries, and the screening rules used to select what kinds of 
firms and projects that are eligible to be funded (Blanes & Busom, 2004). Although market 
failure arguments have provided policymakers with the economic rationale for intervening in 
the R&D market, other policy objectives can co-exist or dominate innovation policies. Among 
these are: (1) technological upgrading of firms (in traditional industries) of particular 
importance and (2) to support national champions (Blanes & Busom, 2000). These three 
policy objectives are discussed below in relation to public funding of R&D activities in the 
business sector. 
 
Correcting market failures 
Governmental interventions in the R&D market are usually justified by the existence of 
market failures. Policy interventions are justified by the sometimes large gap between the 
private and the social rate of return to R&D investments. Large gaps between the private and 
the social rate of return to R&D arise due to incomplete appropriability and spillovers 
between firms (Arrow, 1962). A second type of market failure also exists. This market failure 
addresses the wedge between the rate of return required by a firm investing own funds in a 
R&D project and the return required by external investors (see Hall, 2002 for a review). This 
latter “type” of market failure suggests that some innovations will fail to be developed 
because the cost of external capital is too high, especially for small, young and cash-
constrained firms (Hall, 2002).  
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The main purpose of a R&D program can as such be to correct market failures. If so, we will 
expect the R&D program to fund private R&D projects that, in absence of support, would not 
have been initiated. R&D programs will as such use selection rules where more uncertain 
projects with larger knowledge spillovers are supported or to fund projects where the cost of 
external capital is high. It is hard to empirically identify the existence of market failures.  
Evidence suggests however that market failures affect cash-constrained firms, and especially 
young and small firms (Hall, 2002). 
  
Following Blanes & Busom (2004) we argue that technology programs supporting this 
segment of the business population do so out of a desire to correct market failures. Recent 
innovation policy initiatives, such as the Lisbon Agenda, also stress the importance of 
encouraging innovative behaviour among firms with few proven innovation capabilities. 
Technology programs whose main aim is to correct market failures will be less inclined to 
fund firms with established innovation capabilities. Stimulating innovative efforts among 
firms that in absence of the subsidy would not spend money on innovation should as such be a 
feature of policies which aim to correct market failures. Diversified firms represent an odd 
case in this regard. On the one hand, Nelson (1959) argues that basic science discoveries are 
most likely to be developed by product differentiated firms. Based upon this reasoning one 
might expect technology programs to subsidize diversified firms, at least if they want to 
correct market failures. Reviews of the literature of the Schumpeterian hypothesis argue on 
the other hand that the relationship between diversification and R&D is ambiguous. Few 
empirical studies have concluded in favour of Nelson's theorizing in this particular context 
(Cohen, 1995; Cohen & Levin, 1989). For these reasons we will not treat policy support to 
diversified firms as an indicator of a policy aim to correct market failures.  
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Promoting national champions 
A second objective in R&D and innovation policy is to foster national champions. Within the 
framework of this innovation policy we will expect policymakers to subsidize R&D activity 
with high (expected) commercial success. Public R&D funds will be distributed to firms and 
projects largely independently of whether the gap between the private and social rate of return 
to R&D investments is small or high. Technology programs established to promote national 
champions are expected to fund larger firms, with proven innovation capabilities, domestic 
firms and firms with a higher export orientation. Firms that are part of a group or diversified 
firms are also more likely to receive a subsidy under this policy scheme. We expect larger 
firms, with better cash-flow, domestic ownership, being a part of a group, and diversified 
firms to be most likely to receive public funding from a technology program if the objective is 
to promote national champions.  
 
Technological upgrading 
A third goal with high policy relevance is to promote technological upgrading of firms in 
traditional industries. Firms in traditional industries tend to be older and employ a large 
fraction of the workforce.  We expect firm size and age to be positive predictor variables for 
obtaining a subsidy under this kind of R&D policy. Diversified firms or group membership 
will be negative predictors as these kinds of firms are less vulnerable to harsh market 
conditions.  Prior innovation experience will be negatively related to the probability of getting 
access to subsidies under this policy scheme. Firms with better cash-flow are also less likely 
to participate in these technology programs. Export activity can on the other hand be a 
positive predictor variable under this policy logic.  
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Drawing and extending upon Blanes & Busom (2004) table 1 below summarizes the expected 
relationships between firm characteristics and the selection rules and policy objectives of 
R&D programs.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table 1 the question marks (?) indicate an undetermined relationship between certain firm 
characteristics and the different policy objectives that R&D programs are expected to pursue. 
A “+” sign signals that larger values on the variable in question will enhance the probability 
of being subsidized. As an example, we expect larger size to be positively (and significantly) 
related to participation status in technology programs where the aim is to support national 
champions. A “-” sign signals that larger values on the variable in question will decrease the 
probability of being subsidized. As an example, we expect that better cash-flow will decrease 
the probability of being included in technology policy programs that are established with 
“technological upgrading” objectives in mind.  
 
R&D support to firms in Norway 
A recent policy document reveals that Norway has adopted the Lisbon Agenda in many 
respects, at least seen from policymakers’ point of view (NHD, 2006).  Major policies issues 
in this context are to facilitate growth, R&D and innovation. According to the Lisbon Agenda 
policymakers should create a supportive environment for SMEs in order to facilitate and 
strengthen the growth and innovative potential of these firms. Improved access to public R&D 
funds, more efficient use of subsidies to leverage private R&D spending, and improving 
innovation support services, are highlighted policy strategies in the Lisbon Agenda (NHD, 
2006).    16
 
Norwegian policy documents do in some contrast argue that innovation policies should 
support “young firms”, “large already innovative firms”, “SMEs with a growth potential”, and 
firms with an “international growth potential” (NHD, 2003; NHD, 2005) . With the exception 
of young firms, the focus in these policy documents upon already “innovating firms” and 
firms who already “possess a growth potential” stand out in some contrast to the 
recommendations in the Lisbon Agenda. The problem seen from market failure and 
innovation system perspectives is the policy desire to fund “the winners”. Recent Norwegian 
policy documents thus seem to be in line with a policy objective to support the development 
of national champions.  
 
The “comparison” of recent innovation policy documents from Norway with the 
recommendations in the Lisbon Agenda is stylized. In the spirit of this paper we are more 
concerned with what actually happens at the level of technology programs.  To what extent do 
technology programs in Norway support “already innovating firms” and companies with a 
“growth potential” prior to their participation in technology programs? In the section below 
we describe and discuss the 5 most important technology programs in Norway. We will also 
provide some descriptive statistics that illustrate the importance of these five technology 
programs for different types of firms and industries in the Norwegian context. We are 
especially interested in the distribution of subsidies among industries and firm size classes, at 
both the aggregate level and at the level of technology programs. 
 
There is no official production of statistics that reveals the distribution of subsidies at the level 
of technology programs in Norway. For instance, in Wicken's (2000) historical analysis of 
Norwegian technology policy, differences between technology programs are left unexplored   17
in the statistical - descriptive analysis. Little is further known in Norway about EU subsidized 
firms. The allocation of EU subsidies to Norwegian firms is a recent phenomenon. Allocation 
of EU subsidies is also a policy area over which Norwegian policymakers have little control. 
Below the five most important technology programs in operation in Norway in 2001 are 
described. 
  
(1) SND – is the State Industrial and Development Fund. SND was established in 1993 by 
merging the “Industry fund” (Industrifondet), the “SME fund” (Småbedriftsfondet) 
and the “Development fund” (Distriktenes utviklingsfond). Especially the Industry 
fund and the Development fund were originally established with a policy aim in mind 
to support private development activities. According to Wicken (2000) this included a 
strong policy focus upon the private rate of return from public R&D support. SND has 
to a large extent continued this policy focus (Wicken, 2000). 
(2)  NRC – is the Norwegian Research Council. NRC was established in 1993 when 5 
different research councils were merged. The main type of R&D subsidy the NRC 
allocates to firms is in the form of a research grant where firms can decide how to use 
the subsidy largely by themselves. Subsidies from NRC are mainly allocated to firms 
in a competitive arrangement. The “best” proposals picked by industry experts and 
renowned researchers are funded.   
(3) Ministries – Firms can also get support directly from Governmental Ministries.  In the 
survey policy support from Ministries includes subsidies from local and regional 
authorities. Little is known about the actual role of Ministries in the public support 
system for R&D and innovation in Norway.     18
(4) European Union (EU) – Norwegian firms can also get support from the European 
Union, especially through the framework programs. Less is known about the role of 
EU subsidies in the Norwegian innovation system.  
(5) FUNN – is the predecessor to the current R&D tax credit policy called SkatteFUNN 
in Norway. FUNN was however operated as a subsidy scheme by the NRC where the 
main policy goal was to provide firms with an “easy and un-bureaucratic” access to 
public R&D financing.  
 
What is the importance of these technology programs for supporting and financing R&D 
activity among firms in Norway?  Tables 2 and 3 provide some answers.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
According to table 2, the value of total public R&D funding in Norway was 943 million NOK 
in 2001 (about 118 million Euro). At the same time, total internal R&D spending in Norway, 
in the private sector, constituted 12614 million NOK. Considerable differences between 
technology programs exist however when it comes to the total amount allocated to supporting 
internal R&D activities in the private sector. According to table 2, Ministries was in fact the 
largest source of direct public R&D funding for Norwegian firms in 2001, followed by the 
Research Council, EU, SND and then FUNN. The statistics underline that Ministries are a 
very important source of public R&D financing in the Norwegian innovation system. Because 
there is no prior data on public R&D funding per technology policy program in Norway we 
do not really know whether 2001 was a special year or not in that regard. In table 3 below, we 
explore differences between technology programs in more detail.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]   19
According to table 3 the lowest average subsidy is allocated from FUNN and SND. Firms 
seeking out subsidies from these two R&D programs received in average 0, 4 Mill NOK to 
finance their R&D projects in 2001. By far the largest subsidy was allocated from Ministries 
where firms in average were supported with 6, 5 mill NOK.  Differences between R&D 
programs can partly be explained by the fact that the number of supported firms differs 
substantially. Whereas SND financed R&D projects among 208 firms, EU and Ministries 
financed R&D projects among respectively 49 and 79 firms. 
 
Technology programs are heterogeneous when it comes to the importance of the subsidy in 
relation to total internal R&D efforts at the firm level. Subsidies from both Ministries and 
SND stand out in comparison to the other R&D programs. Firms subsidized by Ministries got 
in fact 40 % of their innovation costs covered by the subsidy, followed by SND where the 
subsidy covered about 12 % of the innovation costs. This stands out in comparison to NRC, 
EU and FUNN where subsidies covered between 3-6 % of total R&D costs (in average). The 
descriptive statistics provided in table 3 suggest the existence of one important source of 
heterogeneity among technology programs in Norway, namely the degree to which subsidies 
cover total internal R&D costs at the firm level.  
 
In table 4 and 5, we explore the extent to which the 5 technology programs subsidize firms in 
the same industry. In order to provide readers with a sense of the “economic importance” of 
particular industrial sectors in Norway, we have provided the actual number of employees at 
the 2.digit NACE level, and industry employment as percentage of total employment. We 
have used the number of employees as provided by the firm managers in the R&D survey 
which is discussed below. These employment statistics will deviate from those produced by 
Statistics Norway because we use the R&D survey data in the calculation of the employment   20
figures. The survey data is not representative for enterprises with less than 10 employees. The 
figures should be fairly accurate when it comes to the industry share of employment in firms 
with 10 employees or more.  It is also important to use the same database for consistency 
reasons. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The figures for total R&D in table 4 are the actual level of expenditure reported by the firms 
in the R&D survey, aggregated to the 2. digit NACE industry level. It includes private and 
public R&D financing. The two first columns display the actual and relative level of R&D at 
the industry level in Norway in 2001. A brief look at the table informs us that a few industrial 
sectors account for most of the total R&D spending in Norway, most notably firms in NACE 
72, 32, 24 and 29 which do about 45% total R&D. At the same time these four sectors got 
approximately 63 % of total available public R&D resources, and accounted for about 11 % 
of employment. Firms in NACE 29 stand out as firms in this industry did 7,4 % of total R&D, 
got 37 % of all public R&D, and accounted for only 3 % of employment. It can be noted here 
that the figures for total R&D include public financing. As a whole, table 4 shows that public 
R&D financing is concentrated to a few sectors and covers a relatively small proportion of the 
Norwegian business sector in terms of employment.  Because the spirit of this paper is to 
explore the diversity of public R&D funding, table 4 is essentially reproduced below, but now 
exploring the extent to which the same industrial sectors are financed by different technology 
programs.     
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
   21
In table 5 we see that firms in the same 4 sectors still get access to a substantial amount of 
public R&D resources from our 5 technology programs. Considerable diversity exists 
however and this is the dominant tendency in table 5. Hardly any sector that received more 
than 10 % of total funding from a technology program, got access to more than 10 % of the 
funding from any other technology program in our study. The statistics suggest that our five 
technology programs have different policy objectives, subsidize different kinds of firms, and 
as such stimulate a diversity of approaches to innovation. Looking at essentially the same 
statistics, but now distributed according to size classes, reveals another interesting pattern.   
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
When comparing the relative shares of total and public R&D, and the % of total employment 
in table 6 according to size classes, we find a high degree of “correspondence”. For instance, 
firms with 10-30 employees did 15 % of total R&D in the private sector, received 14,9 % of 
public funding, and accounted for about 19 % of employment. But as table 7 reveals, the 
aggregate distribution of public R&D funding according to firm size classes “hides” some 
diversity when we reproduce table 6, but now exploring differences between technology 
programs.    
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table 7, we see that over 50 % of total public funding from NRC, EU and Ministry are 
allocated to firms with more than 500 employees. The technology programs SND and FUNN 
stand out in comparison to the others. SND diverts about 42 % of total funding to firms with 
10- 30 employees, and subsidies from FUNN are evenly distributed among the size classes in   22
the business sector.  The figures in tables 6- 7 suggest that there is some overlap between 
technology programs, as firms in some industrial sectors, and especially firms in the largest 
size classes, participate in more than one technology program. Table 8 sheds some light over 
these policy dynamics.  
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table 8 we can see that about 81 % of the subsidized firms participate in only one 
technology program. The remaining 19 % participate in 2 or more programs. In section 6 
below we will analyze the firm level propensity to access several technology programs 
simultaneously. We will first shed some light on the actual combination of technology 
programs firms use. This is done in table 9.   
 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table 9 we can see that firms in most cases only get access to one technology program, as 
already discussed. R&D policy does however include a complex “residual component” where 
some firms access a diverse mix of technology programs simultaneously. As we can see in 
table 9, many different combinations of technology programs are actually used by firms to 
finance innovation activities. There is, in other words, a high degree of complexity to 
innovation policies that aim to stimulate R&D activity in the private sector.  
 
For practical evaluation purposes such complexity should ideally be reduced. Although it is 
important to understand the sources of a diverse R&D policy, it is arguably equally important 
to be able to reduce the variety, for instance displayed in table 9, into some more analytical 
dimensions for analytical purposes such as evaluations of technology policies. As discussed   23
by reviews of the literature (David et al, 2000; David & Hall, 2000), taxonomies are helpful 
theoretical tools in this regard. Below we will present and discuss a taxonomy which has been 
developed by Rye (2002).  The taxonomy sheds light on the pattern and dynamics of R&D 
policy participation amongst firms in Norway.   
 
The taxonomy: “Close to” and “far from” the market funding 
Based upon a review of 12 evaluation studies of the public support system for R&D and 
innovation in Norway over two decades, Rye (2002) argues that a “division of labour” 
between R&D programs in Norway has emerged.  It is argued that two main types of R&D 
programs exist and that they subsidize different kinds of firm projects, according to the phases 
in the product cycle. The first type of technology program supports firms with uncertain 
private projects with a high research component “far from the market”.  Mainly NRC and its 
predecessors are associated with this kind of public R&D funding. The second type of R&D 
program supports firms with less uncertain projects “close to the market” and the 
commercialization phase.  These projects contain a high development component, and are 
mainly associated with R&D support from SND and its predecessors.   
 
The taxonomy discriminates between technology programs according to the degree of 
technological uncertainty of private R&D projects. The taxonomy captures as such a 
fundamental source of heterogeneity among R&D programs in Norway. For the non-
Norwegian reader without particular familiarity to the landscape of technology programs in 
Norway there are significant degrees of overlap between the concepts “far from the market” 
and “research” on the one hand, and “close to the market” and “development” on the other 
hand. In our opinion these concepts can be used interchangeably without loss of much 
precision.   24
Since Ryes (2002) review there has been a large-scale re-organization of the number of 
technology programs, where also new R&D programs such as FUNN and EU have come to 
play a major role as sources of public R&D funding for Norwegian firms. Direct financing 
from Ministries was further not covered in the review. Based upon discussions with 
Norwegian technology historians, as well as policymakers, we have included the Ministry 
technology program in the “close to the market” category together with SND, and included 
the technology programs EU and FUNN in the “far from the market” category together with 
NRC. A factor analysis has also been conducted in order to see whether R&D support from 
Ministries, EU and FUNN can be taxonomized into either “close to the market” or “far from 
the market” type of policy support. The results from the factor analysis supported our 
expectations. The reader can refer to the appendix for details.  
 
Method, data and variables 
In this section we will discuss the methodology, data and variables used in the analysis. The 
taxonomy of R&D programs we draw upon in the analysis is based upon the discussion in 
section 4 and the analysis done by Rye (2002). In comparison to Rye (2002) we have access 
to a different dataset and to some extent also access to information about more R&D 
programs. Another important distinction is that we have access to a representative sample of 
the entire Norwegian firm population (with 10 employees or more). In her analysis Rye 
(2002) had access to important - but mainly ad-hoc - policy evaluations. 
 
We will thus refine the taxonomy discussed in section 4 above by adding more R&D 
programs to the analysis. A substantial part of this task is to analyze the firm characteristics 
that are able to discriminate between “non-funded” and “funded” status in relation to our 5 
technology programs. We will use logistic regression for this task. Logistic regression is   25
useful for binary dependant variables where the presence or absence of an outcome is 
analyzed (getting access to a subsidy or not).  
 
Data 
The research in this paper utilizes a novel database well suited to analyze what kind of firms 
that get access to subsidies. The main part of the data is based upon the third version of the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3) and a R&D survey. The surveys were combined and 
initiated in 2002, but mainly refer to the 1999-2001 time period. The combined survey 
contains large amounts of information about firms’ innovation activities (CIS survey) and 
questions about how firms finance their R&D activities (R&D survey). Questions about 
whether firms had received a subsidy from the most important R&D programs in Norway 
were also asked in the questionnaire. Because it is frequently claimed that cash-constrained 
firms seek out public financing due to liquidity constraints we also collected the firms' annual 
accounts which contain information about the financial performance of the firms in CIS 3 / 
R&D survey.    
 
The combined questionnaire was directed to a representative sample of Norwegian firms with 
10 employees or more. Every firm with 50 or more employees was included in the sampling 
frame. The questionnaire was returned by 3899 firms which constitute a response rate of 93 
%, due to its compulsory nature. Because not all firms are obliged to report their annual 
accounts, the total sample size drops by approx. 10 % when variables constructed from the 
annual accounts data are used in the analysis. In the analysis we will assume that receiving a 
subsidy from one technology program will not increase the probability of receiving a subsidy 
from another technology program within the same year (2001). This assumption is similar to 
what Busom (2000) makes in her analysis of national and EU programs in Spain. The   26
dependent variables used in the logistic regression analysis are skewed in the sense that many 
firms do not receive a subsidy (the value 0). Although logistic regression analysis is robust in 
relation to these issues, in an ideal world many more firms would get access to R&D subsidies 
which would reduce this skewed distribution problem. But most evaluators live in the world 
of practical policymaking and must suffice with the data that such processes generate.  
 
Variables 
In the analysis we use five subsidy dummy variables, corresponding to whether or not a firm 
has received a subsidy from FUNN, NRC, SND, EU or Ministries. Firms reporting to have 
revived a subsidy from these R&D programs are given the value 1 on the respective binary 
subsidy variables. Firm characteristics that are believed to be important for firms’ probability 
of receiving a subsidy have also been measured. The variable patent is the firm manager’s 
answer to the following question: Did the firm have any valid patents in 2001? Due to the 
time lag between patent application and the granting of a valid patent by patent offices, 
simultaneity problems should be avoided (1 = yes). Because of the time lag our patent 
variable is a measure of innovation activity in the past that has had a successful outcome (in 
terms of getting a valid patent). As such, our patent variable is a measure of established 
innovation capability. This variable is highly important for our analysis of innovation policy 
practice at the level of technology programs. Recent Norwegian policy documents highlight 
the importance of supporting firms with already established innovation capabilities.  
 
We discussed above that some R&D programs might be tempted to support firms with a high 
growth trajectory prior to the allocation of the subsidy, due to political pressures for “high 
success rates”. Growth is a clear measure of success and success is believed to be highly   27
correlated with the degree of innovativeness. Firms’ growth rate is also a highly important 
explanatory variable in the context of our study as Norwegian policy documents seem to 
highlight the importance of supporting firms with a “growth” potential.  To account for this, 
we include the percentage growth in employment from 1999 to 2001. Because a small fraction 
of the firms did not have any employees in 1999, we added the value 1 to the number of 
employees at the firm level in 1999 before we calculated our growth measure. As such we 
count the founder of the firm as an employee. Export activity is measured as the share of 
exports in total turnover in 1999. Information about turnover and exports was provided by the 
firm manager. Export activity measures the degree to which firms with an “international 
growth potential” are funded by technology programs in the Norwegian Innovation System. 
This is also highlighted by recent innovation policy documents as discussed in section 4.  
 
The variable group is a dummy and indicates whether a firm is a part of a group or not (1 = 
yes). Diversification is an aspect of “economics of scope” and measured as a simple dummy 
indicating whether the firm is diversified or not (1=yes). Larger firms are more likely to get 
access to public resources, at least under some innovation policy support schemes. Size is 
measured by the number of employees in 1999. As discussed in section 4, technology 
programs are recommended to fund innovative large firms. Most large firms in Norway are 
innovative according to the most recent innovation surveys (Statistics Norway, 2007). We 
have dummy coded size into different kinds of size classes. The highest size class, “500 +” is 
the reference category. Age is defined as the number of years from when the firm was 
established. The importance of funding young firms is highlighted in both the Lisbon Agenda, 
and in recent Norwegian policy documents. Age is dummy coded into different age classes. 
The highest age class, “50+”, is used as the reference category. From the annual accounts 
database we use firms’ cash-flow in order to create a measure of liquidity constraints. Cash-  28
flow is defined as cash-flow divided by the number of employees in 2000. Foreign 
ownership is also included, measured as whether or not the firm's headquarter is located in 
another country (1 = yes). 
   
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Analysis 
We will start the analysis by estimating whether the measured firm characteristics can 
discriminate between “non-funded” and “funded” participation status in relation to our 5 
technology programs. As such, we will analyze how innovation & R&D policies are 
implemented in practice, and whether policy patterns exist when it comes to what kind of 
firms that get access to R&D subsidies in Norway. An important part of this analysis is to 
discuss whether the 5 most important technology programs in Norway are driven by an 
innovation policy objective to (1) correct market failures, (2) support national champions, or 
(3) encourage technological upgrading, according to the scheme developed in table 1. This is 
done below, where we estimate the following equation using logistic regression: 
 
Y1 = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 + B4X4 + B5X5 + B6X6 + B7X7 + B8X8 + B9X9 + B10X10 +B11X11 
+ B12X12 + B13X13 + B14X14 + B15X15 + E1  
 
Where Y1 is a binary variable indicating whether a firm has received a subsidy from a specific 
technology program, X1 is size0-10, X2 is size11-50, X3 is size51-100, X4 is size101-300, X5 
is size301-500, X6 is age0-5, X7 is age6-10, X8 is age11-20, X9 is age21-50, X10 is group, X11 
is patent, X12 is export activity, X13 is diversification, X14 is foreign ownership, X15 is growth, 
and E1 is the error term.    29
 
The results are presented in tables 11-16 below. In the analysis we have dropped the cash-
flow variable because it did not come out significantly (results not reported). The reason is 
that some firms have missing values for the cash-flow variable. Industrial sector dummies are 
also included but not reported due to space considerations. 
 
NRC Subsidies 
In table 10 we showed that 40 % of our subsidized firms got access to a NRC subsidy. Below 
we analyze (some of the) firm characteristics that arguably can predict participation status in 
this technology policy program.    
 
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
 
According to table 11, the largest firms are more able to attract public R&D funding from the 
NRC program. The reference category is firms with more than 500 employees and the 
reference category is included in the constant. We thus see that firms in the smaller size 
categories are significantly less likely to participate in this technology program compared to 
firms in the highest size categories. Export oriented firms and companies with proven 
innovation capabilities are significantly more likely to attract funding from NRC. Hence, 
NRC funds innovation projects “far from the market”, or research activities, among these 
kinds of firms. According to the classification of technology program policy aims in table 1, it 
seems like NRC follows a policy objective to support the development of national champions, 
as firm size, patent and export activity can predict participation status in this R&D program.    
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SND subsidies 
Subsidies from SND are allocated, in relative terms, to many firms.  Among our subsidized 
firms, 35 % got access to a SND subsidy in 2001 as shown in table 10. Below we analyze 
(some of the) firm characteristics that can predict participation status in this technology policy 
program.    
 
[TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table 12 we see that “middle aged” companies between 21-50 years old have a significantly 
higher propensity to be included in the SND program compared to the reference category (50 
years or older firms). “Middle-sized” firms with 101-300 employees have on the other hand a 
significantly lower propensity to be included in the SND program compared to the reference 
category (firms with more than 500 employees). These results suggest that medium-sized 
firms are far less inclined to be included in this technology program compared to small and 
large firms while “middle aged” companies are significantly more inclined to get access to a 
subsidy from the SND program compared to old and young companies.   
 
Companies with group membership, proven innovation capabilities, and a higher export 
orientation are more likely to participate in this technology program.  Diversified firms and 
companies with foreign ownership are on the other hand less inclined to obtain SND support. 
The SND program thus seems to be driven by combined policy logic to support both national 
champions and to undertake technological upgrading of existing industry according to the 
scheme in table 1. SND thus finances innovation projects “close to the market” in the private 
sector in order to reach these policy objectives. 
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We have so far examined the firm level determinants of participation status among the two 
most well-known technology programs in Norway. In the table below we explore what kinds 
of firms that are subsidized directly by Ministries. This is an under-explored issue in our 
Norwegian context.       
 
Ministry subsidies 
According to table 10, about 16 % of our subsidized firms got access to a subsidy from one of 
the Ministries. As such, Ministries do not seem to support many firms directly, although a lot 
of money is usually involved when they first support firms. Below we analyze (some of the) 
firm characteristics that can predict participation status in this technology policy program.    
 
[TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE] 
 
According to table 13, foreign owned firms, and smaller firms are less inclined to be 
subsidized directly by Ministries. All the firm size categories / dummies are negative and 
significant which implies that the largest companies in Norway, those with 500 or more 
employees, are significantly more inclined to get access to a subsidy from one of the 
Ministries compared to smaller firms. Relatively few variables emerge as significant 
predictors. It is as such hard to classify R&D support from Ministries according to the 
underlying policy objectives developed in table 1.  
 
It is clear on the other hand that Ministries do not fund companies with an aim to correct 
market failures. Both technological upgrading and supporting the development of national 
champions seem to be predominant policy objectives when Ministries subsidize innovation 
activities “close to the market” at the firm level. It is important to point out that R&D   32
subsidies from different Ministries can be driven by different policy objectives. This can 
explain why we are incapable of distinguishing whether R&D support from Ministries is 
allocated according to a single policy objective.  The role of R&D support from Ministries to 
firms in Norway continues to pose a research challenge. Less is also known in Norway about 
what kinds of companies that get access to EU subsidies.  This is explored below.  
 
EU subsidies 
According to table 10 about 14 % of our subsidized firms got access to an EU subsidy in 
2001. Below we analyze (some of the) firm characteristics that determine whether firms are 
funded by EU within the context of the Norwegian innovation system.   
 
[TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table 14 we see that larger firms, with previous innovation and export activity are more 
inclined to get access to an EU subsidy. This is a pattern that is fairly close to what we found 
in table 11, where we analyzed what kinds of firms that participated in NRC technology 
program. There is one exception:  Younger companies are significantly more inclined to 
participate in EU programs. Firms in the age range of 0 to 5 years are significantly more 
inclined to get access to public R&D finance from EU compared to firms in the other age 
categories. Although one should not overstate this finding, it is one of the few signs so far that 
technology programs in our Norwegian case actually aim to correct market failures. This is 
done by supporting firms with innovation projects “far from the market”. It is interesting that 
EU policy support, a policy area over which Norwegian policymakers have little control, at 
least partly aims to correct market failures in the Norwegian innovation system.  However, 
firm size, export and innovation activity also act as positive and significant predictors. These   33




The FUNN program was a rather small technology program in 2001, measured in terms of the 
total amount of public R&D funding distributed to firms.  28 % of the subsidized firms in our 
sample were on the other hand funded by this technology program. Below we analyze what 
kind of firms.  
 
[TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE] 
 
When it comes to obtaining subsidies from the FUNN program, export orientation and prior 
innovation activity alongside with large firm size are positive predictor variables as can be 
seen in table 15.  Being a part of a group is however a negative predictor. The results 
displayed in table 15 more or less show that also the FUNN program aims to support the 
development of national champions. This is mainly done by financing innovation projects “far 
from the market” in the Norwegian enterprise sector.  
 
Participation in several programs 
Having explored the firm characteristics that predict participation status among our 5 
technology programs, we will now move on to analyze what kinds of firms that are supported 
by more than 1 technology program. To do this we have run a simple OLS regression where 
the dependent variable is the number of technology programs a firm participates in, ranging 
from zero to five. Because the dependant variables are both censored (they are censored at 
zero) and involve a count of the number of technology programs, we will experiment some   34
and estimate the same regression equation using both Tobit and Poisson regression, in 
addition to the standard OLS. The equation we estimate is similar to equation 1 above, 
although the dependent variable is the number of technology programs. The results are rather 
similar across estimation techniques with the exception that diversification is insignificant 
(though the coefficient is negative) in the OLS regression.  
  
[TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE] 
 
According to table 16, the largest firms in Norway are significantly more inclined to access 
several technology programs simultaneously. Firms with developed innovation capabilities 
and export intensive companies are also significantly more inclined to get access to funding 
from several programs at the same time. Some firm characteristics also emerge as negative 
predictors. Somewhat contrary to our expectation it turns out that diversified companies are 
significantly less likely to access several technology programs simultaneously. We expected 
the opposite due to economies of scope advantages where firms with several business units 
would be more inclined to apply for participation in several technology programs at the same 
time. This is not the case. Foreign firms are also less likely to get funding from several 
technology programs in Norway, which demonstrates that the Norwegian public support 
system for innovation is mainly developed with an aim to support domestic companies and 
national champions.  
 
Summary and discussion of the results 
The results inform us that most technology programs aim to support the development of 
national champions, although the SND program also allocates innovation funding according 
to criteria that are close to “technological upgrading” objectives. There are few, if any, signs   35
that technology programs in Norway aim to correct market failures. A possible exception is 
EU financing which is more inclined to be allocated to young firms. A consideration of the 
most important firm characteristics reveals that export intensive companies were significantly 
more likely to get access to public R&D subsidies from all of our five technology programs. 
This finding suggests that the public support and innovation system for R&D is, to some 
extent, built around the importance of export active firms.  
 
In standard economic textbooks Norway is usually put forth as a small and open economy 
where trade with other countries is important. Thus, increasing and subsidizing innovation 
activity in the export active segment of the firm population in Norway could be a continuation 
of more traditional policies to encourage Norwegian firms to compete in international 
markets. In this context one should not downplay the importance of the Lisbon process in the 
EU for Norwegian firms.  Although the Lisbon strategy has a diverse range of implications, 
the overall policy goal of the strategy is to make the EU area one of the most dynamic and 
knowledge based economies in the world by 2010. In order to compete in the EU market, 
Norwegian firms should raise the knowledge content – or R&D content – of their products 
and services. The public support system for R&D in Norway seems to be more than willing to 
help Norwegian firms do just that. This is a policy strategy that can be described as 
“supporting the development of national champions”. 
 
The importance of having established innovation capabilities in order to access public R&D 
support is also highlighted in the analysis. Firms with successful innovative activities in the 
past were significantly more likely to access public R&D funding from 4 out of 5 technology 
programs. This suggests that the public support system for R&D is built around an innovative 
business segment, where firms without previous innovation activity are not included. To what   36
extent this is an intended R&D policy, in the sense that non-innovative Norwegian firms are 
denied access to public R&D funding, or whether non-innovative Norwegian firms do not 
apply for public funding because they are not innovative, is an important question for further 
research. The first scenario would in fact suggest the existence of a self-reinforcing 
mechanism in the Norwegian public support system for R&D where technology programs 
fund innovative firms, which due to public support are able to initiate more innovation 
projects, and as a result are even more likely to require public funding in subsequent years. 
The second scenario implies the existence of a large business segment in Norway where firms 
devote few resources to innovation and as such do not apply for public R&D funding.  
 
The largest firms in Norway are further much more likely to access R&D subsidies. The 
importance of both large firm size and established innovation capabilities as important firm 
level determinants of public R&D funding is also highlighted by evaluations of the public 
support system in other European countries.  The Norwegian public support system for R&D 
is not a “deviating” case in this regard, although we have been able to explore the extent to 
which the most important technology programs follow the same policy objectives.  
 
The overall results suggest that considerable “barriers to entry” might exist for smaller and 
younger firms when it comes to participation in technology programs. A reason why these 
firms are not included in contemporary R&D policy might be due to the fact that technology 
programs in Norway pursue a technology policy where the development of national 
champions is important. If so, the main “barrier to entry” is found at the level of practical 
policymaking where smaller and younger firms are denied access to technology programs. 
Another “barrier to entry” can also exist. If most young and small companies simply do not 
innovate, then the inability to launch new innovation projects is the main barrier to entry in   37
technology programs. In this latter context R&D policy objectives can only to a lesser extent 
be “blamed”.  
 
To find out whether small and young firms apply for - but are declined - access to technology 
programs is thus an important avenue for further research. Such research will lead to a better 
understanding of how innovation policies are implemented in practice and how policies can 
be improved. Because it is frequently argued that small and young firms are highly innovative 
(Acs & Audretsch, 2003; Rothwell, 1989) an “innovation potential” might exist in the small 
and young segment of the Norwegian enterprise sector. R&D policies can arguably stimulate 
and enhance this potential. Because small and young firms are significantly less likely to be 
subsidized, changing or allocating more public R&D resources to this segment of the business 
population can be an efficient R&D policy response to the current decline in innovative 
activity in the private sector in Norway. 
 
According to the most recent innovation surveys conducted by Statistics Norway (SSB, 
2007), there has been a decline of “innovativeness” in the Norwegian firm population over the 
last few years. The biggest firms are however highly innovative (SSB, 2007).  It is as such 
interesting that the largest firms in Norway are much more likely to be subsidized and that 
these firms at the same time are highly innovative. Differences in the distribution of R&D 
subsidies between large and small firms could as such be a part of the explanation as to why 
the largest firms are able to persistently innovate in Norway.  
 
A somewhat crude conclusion is that the public support system for R&D in Norway is built 
around companies with a strong export orientation, with developed innovation capabilities, 
and around the largest firms.  This segment of the firm population is heavily supported and   38
firms within this segment are much more inclined to access several technology programs 
simultaneously. Innovation policy interacts with the innovative, export-intensive and large 
firm segment of the firm population in complex ways. As we saw in table 8 and 9 and in the 
analysis in table 16, this business segment is more inclined to access several technology 
programs simultaneously and the actual combination of technology programs these firms 
access is highly diverse.  
 
The co-existence of 5 important technology programs in Norwegian Innovation System may 
at first sight give the impression that there is a high degree of variety at the level of 
technology programs. This is true to some extent: Technology programs support both 
“development” and “research” projects at the firm level. The business segment of subsidized 
firms is on the other hand rather homogenous. As we discussed above, export-oriented, 
innovative and large firms are significantly more likely to get access to R&D funding by all 
our five technology programs, with a few small exceptions. An implication is that R&D 
policies stimulate the realization of diverse innovation projects among this rather narrow part 
of the enterprise population in Norway, according to a policy objective to stimulate the 
development of national champions. 
 
Our interpretation of these empirical results is that the policy practice observed at the level of 
technology programs in Norway are largely consistent with recent innovation policy 
documents where the importance of funding large firms, companies with established 
innovative capabilities, and firms with an international growth potential are highlighted. It is 
notable that these companies already possess innovative capabilities and an international 
growth potential before they are funded by technology programs. An important question in   39
this context is whether R&D subsidies can make these companies even more innovative and 
increase their international growth potential even more.  
 
The observed policy practice is somewhat inconsistent with some recommendations in the 
Lisbon Agenda. With the exception of EU subsidies, young firms are less inclined to access 
technology programs in Norway. Smaller firms are also to a considerable extent excluded 
from Norwegian innovation policy, most notably from technology programs with a high 
research component (EU and NRC programs). Most importantly however, firms without 
established innovative capabilities and companies without an “international growth potential” 
seem to be denied access to technology programs.  As such, technology programs in Norway 
do not “turn” these companies into “innovating” and “high performing” companies. The 
observed policy practice is inconsistent with a notion about an “active innovation policy” that 
has been set forth by Norwegian policymakers recently.   
 
From a market failure perspective an active innovation policy attempts to “turn” firms without 
growth potential and innovative capabilities into companies with the opposite characteristics. 
From an innovation systems perspective our results suggest that technology programs do not 
increase the number of innovating firms in the enterprise sector. Rather, innovation policies 
are oriented towards stimulating established innovators to innovate more intensively. Hence, 
firms with established approaches to innovation are subsidized with “research” and 
“development” subsidies.  
 
There is a time lag here between the data used in the analysis and the formulation and 
implementation of innovation policy. If the innovation policy process is inert – as we suspect 
it is – then we do not believe that much has changed since 2001. We will explore this issue in   40
the future as more recent survey data will become available to us. Our empirical investigation 
is also conducted within the context of public R&D policy. Whether non-R&D policies that 
interact with the firm level are established with an aim to support the development of national 
champions is a rather open – an interesting – question for further analysis.  
 
It is important to emphasise in this context that we can not infer any relationship about how 
R&D policy interacts with the smaller firm size segment of the enterprise population. The 
database we draw upon in this paper is limited to firms with 10 employees or more.  An 
avenue for future research is to analyze how innovation policy impacts upon enterprises with 
less than 10 employees in Norway and elsewhere. This segment of the enterprise population 
accounts for 91,6 % of the enterprise population with 1 employee or more. Hence, little is 
known about what kind of R&D and innovation activities that are undertaken by these firms. 
Even less is known about how innovation policies impact upon innovation processes in this 
segment of the enterprise population.  Within the context of the Lisbon Agenda, where the 
importance of small and young companies has been highlighted, this issue is more important 
then ever. An important issue to be addressed in future innovation surveys is to include 
questions about whether firms have applied for an R&D subsidy but were subsequently 
declined funding by technology programs. In present innovation surveys we only know 
whether a firm is funded or not. 
 
Conclusion 
The main goal in this paper has been to focus on the participation stage and analyze what 
kinds firms that access public R&D subsidies from the five most important technology 
programs in Norway.  The analysis showed that the public support system for R&D in 
Norway is built around companies with a strong export orientation, with developed innovation   41
capabilities, and around the largest firms. Firms within this segment of the firm population are 
more inclined to get access to “development” and “research” subsidies by technology 
programs. Subsidies are mainly allocated to firms according to innovation policy criteria that 
can be described as the development of national champions. 
 
Our analysis suggests that observed innovation policy practice is consistent with recent 
Norwegian innovation policy documents and recommendations, but somewhat inconsistent 
with recommendations in the Lisbon Agenda. From an innovation system perspective, and a 
market failure perspective, the main innovation policy challenge in Norway is to allocate 
innovation support to firms without established growth and innovative capabilities. “Turning” 
companies without prior innovative capability and international growth potential into 
companies with the opposite characteristics can strongly stimulate to more growth and 
innovation in the Norwegian Innovation System.   
  
These findings illustrate the following: By using a taxonomy of R&D programs, and by 
focusing upon the participation stage, one can better analyze and understand the pattern of 
interaction between firms and vital aspects of the national innovation and public support 
system for R&D. Based upon such analyses it is possible to get an understanding of how the 
public support system for R&D and innovation works in practice, how innovation policies 
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Appendix 
We have conducted a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation in order to 
analyze whether there are some similarities between R&D projects subsidized by technology 
programs in Norway. The analysis is motivated by Rye’s (2002) review of 12 major 
evaluations of the public support system for R&D in Norway. In this review R&D subsidies 
from SND were deemed to be allocated to firms with projects “close to the market” while 
subsidies from NRC were distributed to companies with projects “far from the market”. We 
will use these two technology programs as reference indicators. Based upon the analysis done 
by Rye (2002), we argue that technology programs grouped together with SND support firm 
projects “close to the market” and that R&D programs grouped together with NRC support 
firm projects “far from the market”. The main assumption behind the analysis is that the 
pattern of correlations between the R&D subsidies from different technology programs is 
caused by underlying non-observable similarities in the type of private R&D projects 
supported. In table A1, results from the first factor analysis are reported.  
 
[TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table A1 we have reported the results from the rotated factor solution. In the rotated factor 
solution each loading represents the partial correlation between the latent factor and the single 
item indicator (the binary subsidy variable). According to the reported results, two underlying 
latent factors are identified. The subsidies allocated by FUNN, NRC and EU all load high on 
the first factor. NRC is the reference indicator in this regard. Because the NRC program has 
been found to support firm projects “far from the market”, other technology programs 
grouped together with NRC share this characteristic.  The SND and Ministry subsidy   47
variables load high on the second factor. This finding suggests that subsidies from these two 
technology programs are allocated to firm projects “close to the market”.  
 
The column “cumulative %” reports the percent of the variance accounted for by each specific 
factor. As we can see in the table, the two factors can explain 53 % of the variance in the 
subsidy variables, which is rather good. Although principal components factor analysis is a 
rather robust method, binary items are not ideal. Therefore we will re-run the principal 
components factor analysis. Instead of binary subsidy indicators we will use the actual 
amount of the subsidy (in log form) firms get from the technology programs. Taking the 
amount of the subsidy into account can introduce some “noise” in the analysis because we are 
not primarily interested in identifying latent structures when it comes to how much money 
R&D programs allocate to firms.  Our main interest is to identify latent factors in association 
with the types of private R&D projects technology programs fund in Norway. The results are 
however similar, as illustrated in the table below.   
 
[TABLE A2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The factor solutions reported in table A1 and A2 are practically identical. Results from the 
two factor analyses suggest that public support from the five most important R&D programs 
in Norway is allocated to either projects “far from the market” or to projects “close to the 
market”. We have also experimented by constraining the factor analysis to R&D doing firms. 
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Table 1. R&D program policy objective and their expected selection rules  
  Market failure  National champions  Technological upgrading 
Prior innovation activity  -  +  - 
Firm age  -  ?  + 
Firm size  -  +  + 
Foreign ownership  ?  -  ? 
Group -  +  - 
Diversified -  +  - 
Cash-flow -  +  - 
Export activity  ?  +  + 
Growth ?  +  - 
 
Table 2. R&D and subsidy statistics in mill. NOK for the private sector in Norway 
  Sum in Mill. NOK. 
Subsidies from EU  101 
Subsidies from Ministries  514 
Subsidies from SND  85 
Subsidies from FUNN  42 
Subsidies from NRC  202 
Total public funding  943 
Total internal R&D in private sector  12614 
N =   3899 / 11832 (weighted) 
Source: Own calculation based upon weighted R&D survey data for 2001 (data discussed below). 
 
Table 3. R&D and subsidy statistics in Mill. NOK for the sub-sample of subsidized firms. 




Sum internal R&D 
(mill. NOK) 
% of the subsidy in 
total internal R&D 
N 
NRC 202  1  3488  6  %  190 
EU 101  2,1  2124  5  %  49 
FUNN 42  0,4  1369  3  %  107 
SND 85  0,4  712  12  %  208 
Ministries 514  6,5  1298  40  %  79 













   49
Table 4. Actual and relative distribution of total – and publicly financed - R&D and 
employment according to industries.  
  Internal R&D 
in Mill. NOK. 
% of total 
R&D 
Public R&D 
in Mill. NOK  





% of total 
employment 
Fishing & fish farming (5)  272,5 2,2 15,1  1,6 3799  0,5 
Mining of coal and lignite (10)  0  0,0  0  0,0  273  0,0 
Petroleum and natural gas (11)  754,5  6,0  22  2,3  30204  4,3 
Mining of metal ores (13)  5,5  0,0 28  3,0 360  0,1 
Other mining (14)  12,8  0,1 4,6  0,5 2441  0,4 
Food prod. and beverages (15)  369  2,9 23,2  2,5 52653  7,6 
Tobacco  (16)  0 0,0  0 0,0  480  0,1 
Textiles  (17)  25,5  0,2 0,5  0,1 3961  0,6 
Apparel & dying (18)  35,5  0,3  1,7  0,2  1090  0,2 
Leather products (19)  6,6  0,1  0,6  0,1  359  0,1 
Wood products (20)  56,6  0,4  7,5  0,8  13178  1,9 
Pulp & paper (21)  159,9  1,3  0,9  0,1  8503  1,2 
Publishing & printing (22)  32,1  0,3  0,5  0,1  28641  4,1 
Chemicals  (24)  1057,8  8,4 24,8  2,6 23182  3,3 
Rubber & plastics (25)  57,9  0,5  7,7  0,8  5783  0,8 
Non-metallic minerals (26)  66,8  0,5 3,9  0,4 9001  1,3 
Basic metals (27)  405,7 3,2 2,2  0,2 12981  1,9 
Fabricated metal prod. (28)  140,9 1,1 12,6  1,3 16648  2,4 
Machinery & equip. N.E.C 
(29)  934,3 7,4 351,6 37,3  20761  3,0 
Office machinery & comp. 
(30)  67  0,5 2,5  0,3 367  0,1 
Electric machinery & app. 
(31)  392  3,1 11,6  1,2 7585  1,1 
Radio, television, com. (32)  1742  13,8  35,2  3,7  6161  0,9 
Medical & optical instr. (33)  511,3 4,1 32,7  3,5 5652  0,8 
Motor  vehicles  (34)  417,2 3,3 6,6  0,7 5555  0,8 
Other transportation equip. 
(35)  274  2,2 16,2  1,7 30823  4,4 
Furniture  (36)  128,3 1,0 5  0,5 10541  1,5 
Recycling  (37)  28,3  0,2 2  0,2 1001  0,1 
Electricity, gas and water (40)  89,7  0,7 6  0,6 16420  2,4 
Coll.  and distrib. of water 
(41)  0,5  0,0 0  0,0 247  0,0 
Construction  (45)  278,5 2,2 14,2  1,5 104526  15,0 
Wholesale  trade  (51)  345,8 2,7 35,7  3,8 74061  10,6 
Land  transport  (60)  12,9  0,1 7,3  0,8 32180  4,6 
Water  transport  (61)  40,4  0,3 1,6  0,2 23663  3,4 
Air transport (62)  4,2  0,0  0  0,0  14330  2,1 
Auxiliary transport act. (63)  27,4  0,2  0,6  0,1  22863  3,3 
Post & telecommunication 
(64)  693,8 5,5 20,1  2,1 12145  1,7 
Financial intermediation (65)  262,2 2,1 7,5  0,8 31459  4,5 
Insurance & pension (66)  93,8  0,7 0,2  0,0 8533  1,2 
Act. Auxiliary to nace 65 (67)  98,9  0,8  0  0,0  3331  0,5 
Computers and related act.  
(72)  1885,6 14,9 177,6  18,8 29158  4,2 
Research and development 
(73)  113  0,9 20  2,1 166  0,0 
Other business activities (74)  712,9 5,7 61  6,5 20564  3,0 
Total  12613,6 100,0 943,4  100,0 695629  100 
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Table 5. Distribution of public R&D funding at the industry level 
  EU finance in 
Mill. NOK 
% of  EU 
finance 
Ministry finance 
in Mill. NOK 
% of Ministry 
finance 
SND finance 




Fishing & fish farming (5)  0,87  0,9  0  0,0 3,6 4,3 
Mining of coal and lignite 
(10)  0 0,0  0  0,0  0 0,0 
Petroleum and natural gas 
(11)  16 15,9  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Mining of metal ores (13)  0 0,0  0,3  0,1  0 0,0 
Other  mining  (14)  0 0,0  0,8  0,2  3 3,5 
Food prod. and beverages 
(15)  0 0,0  2,3  0,4  5 5,9 
Tobacco  (16)  0 0,0  0  0,0  0 0,0 
Textiles  (17)  0 0,0  0  0,0  0 0,0 
Apparel & dying (18)  0  0,0  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Leather products (19)  0  0,0  0  0,0  0,6  0,7 
Wood  products  (20)  0,1 0,1  0  0,0 6,9 8,1 
Pulp & paper (21)  0  0,0  0  0,0  0,1  0,1 
Publishing & printing (22)  0  0,0  0  0,0  0,5  0,6 
Chemicals  (24)  7,3 7,2  1,4  0,3 0,3 0,4 
Rubber & plastics (25)  0  0,0  0,5  0,1  1,5  1,8 
Non-metallic minerals (26)  0,6 0,6  0  0,0 1,7 2,0 
Basic metals (27)  0  0,0  0  0,0  0,5  0,6 
Fabricated metal prod. (28)  1  1,0  1,3  0,3 6,1 7,3 
Machinery & equip. N.E.C 
(29)  4,3 4,3  308,2 59,7  13,3  15,7 
Office machinery & comp. 
(30)  0  0,0  0  0,0 1,2 1,4 
Electric machinery & app. 
(31)  0  0,0  0  0,0 2,8 3,3 
Radio, television, com. (32)  16,1  16,0  4,6  0,9 0,1 0,1 
Medical & optical instr. 
(33)  12,8  12,5  3  0,6 2,8 3,3 
Motor vehicles (34)  0  0,0  0  0,0  1,9  2,2 
Other transportation equip. 
(35)  0,1 0,1  1  0,2 2,3 2,7 
Furniture  (36)  0  0,0  0  0,0 1,1 1,3 
Recycling  (37)  0  0,0  0  0,0 1,8 2,1 
Electricity, gas and water 
(40)  2 2,0  2  0,4  0 0,0 
Coll.  and distrib. of water 
(41)  0 0,0  0  0,0  0 0,0 
Construction  (45)  1,5 1,5  4,9  1,0 1,2 1,4 
Wholesale trade (51)  0  0,0  2,6  0,5  5,5  6,5 
Land  transport  (60)  0  0,0  6,2  1,2 0,9 1,1 
Water  transport  (61)  0,3 0,3  0  0,0 0  0,0 
Air transport (62)  0  0,0  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Auxiliary transport act. (63)  0  0,0  0,1  0,0  0,6  0,7 
Post & telecommunication 
(64)  15 14,9  3  0,6  0  0,0 
Financial intermediation 
(65)  0 0,0  7,5  1,5  0 0,0 
Insurance & pension (66)  0  0,0  0,2  0,0  0  0,0 
Act. Auxiliary to nace 65 
(67)  0 0,0  0  0,0  0 0,0 
Computers and rel. act.  
(72)  4,7  4,7  147  28,6 12,9 15,2 
Research and development 
(73)  4,3 4,3  1  0,2 0  0,0 
Other business activities 
(74)  13,8  13,7  16,5  3,2 6,5 7,7 
Total 100,77  100  514,4  100  84,7  100 
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Table 5 continued. 
  NRC finance in Mill. 
NOK  % of NRC finance  FUNN finance 
in MILL. NOK 
% of FUNN 
finance 
Fishing & fish farming (5)  10  4,9  0,6  1,5 
Mining of coal and lignite (10)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Petroleum and natural gas (11)  5,9  2,9  0  0,0 
Mining of metal ores (13)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Other mining (14)  0,1  0,0  0,7  1,7 
Food products and beverages 
(15)  9 4,4  6,9  16,8 
Tobacco (16)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Textiles (17)  0  0,0  0,5  1,2 
Apparel & dying (18)  0,6  0,3  0,1  0,2 
Leather products (19)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Wood products (20)  0,5  0,2  0,1  0,2 
Pulp & paper (21)  0,6  0,3  0,3  0,7 
Publishing & printing (22)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Chemicals (24)  12,7  6,3  3,2  7,9 
Rubber & plastics (25)  5,4  2,7  0,3  0,7 
Non-metallic minerals (26)  0,2  0,1  1,5  3,7 
Basic metals (27)  0,4  0,2  1,3  3,2 
Fabricated metal products (28)  2  1,0  2,1  5,1 
Machinery & equip. N.E.C (29)  20,4  10,1  5,5  13,5 
Office machinery & computers 
(30)  0,3 0,1  1  2,4 
Electric machinery & app. (31)  4,8  2,4  4  9,8 
Radio, television, com. (32)  14  6,9  0,5  1,2 
Medical & optical instruments 
(33)  13,1 6,5  1  2,4 
Motor vehicles (34)  3,2  1,6  1,5  3,7 
Other transportation equip. (35)  11,8  5,8  1  2,4 
Furniture (36)  1,8  0,9  2  4,9 
Recycling (37)  0  0,0  0,2  0,5 
Electricity, gas and water (40)  1,7  0,8  0,3  0,7 
Collection and distrib. of water 
(41)  0 0,0  0  0,0 
Construction (45)  6,2  3,1  0,35  0,9 
Wholesale trade (51)  27,6  13,6  0  0,0 
Land transport (60)  0  0,0  0,2  0,5 
Water transport (61)  1  0,5  0,3  0,7 
Air transport (62)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Auxiliary transport activities 
(63)  0 0,0  0  0,0 
Post & telecommunication (64)  2,66  1,3  0  0,0 
Financial intermediation (65)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Insurance & pension (66)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Act. auxiliary to nace 65 (67)  0  0,0  0  0,0 
Computers and related act.  (72)  9,9  4,9  3,3  8,1 
Research and development (73)  13,5  6,8  1,1  2,7 
Other business activities (74) 23,1  11,4  1,1  2,7 
Total 202,46  100  40,95  100 
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Table 6. Actual and relative distribution of total – and publicly funding – R&D and 
employment according to size classes.  
 Total  R&D  in 
Mill. NOK 
% of total 
R&D 
Public R&D in 
Mill. NOK. 




% of total 
employment 
10-30 emp.  1920   15,2  140,2  14,9  133953  19,3 
31-50 emp.  1103  8,7  70  7,4  60420  8,7 
51-100 emp.  1033  8,2  60,6  6,4  76629  11,0 
101-300 emp.  2510  19,9  209,3  22,2  117364  16,9 
301-500  emp.  745,9 5,9 31,4  3,3  62244  8,9 
501>  emp.  5302  42,0  431,9  45,8  245019  35,2 
SUM 12613,9  100  943,4  100  695629  100 
Source: Own calculation based upon weighted R&D survey data for 2001 (data discussed below). 
 
Table 7. Actual and relative distribution of different types of public R&D funding according 
to size classes. 
  EU finance in 
Mill. NOK 
% of EU 
finance 
Ministry finance in 
Mill NOK. 
% of Ministry 
finance 
SND finance in 
Mill. NOK. 
% of SND 
finance 
10-30 emp.  5,8  5,7  29,9  5,8  35,3  41,5 
31-50 emp.  15,4  15,3  2,4  0,5  17,9  21,0 
51-100 emp.  7,3  7,2  4,7  0,9  11,3  13,3 
101-300 emp.  17  16,8  153  29,7  9,4  11,0 
301-500  emp.  4,2  4,2  8,5  1,7 6,2 7,3 
501>  emp.  51,2  50,7  315,9  61,4  5  5,9 
SUM 100,9  100  514,4  100  85,1  100 
 
Table 7 continued.  
 NRC  finance  in 
Mill. NOK 
% of NRC 
finance 
FUNN finance 
in Mill. NOK. 
% of FUNN 
finance 
10-30 emp.  60,3  29,9  9  21,6 
31-50 emp.  30,1  14,9  4,3  10,3 
51-100 emp.  29,3  14,5  8  19,2 
101-300 emp.  19,4  9,6  10,6  25,4 
301-500 emp.  10,8  5,4  1,7  4,1 
501>  emp.  51,7  25,6  8,1  19,4 
SUM 201,6  100 41,7  100 
Source: Own calculation based upon weighted R&D survey data for 2001 (data discussed below). 
 
 
Table 8. Participation in technology programs, sub-sample of subsidized firms 
Number of technology programs   Frequency and percentage of firms using one – 
or more – technology programs.  
1 technology program  409 (80,9 %) 
2 technology programs  73 (14,4 %) 
3 technology programs  17 (3,4 %) 
4 technology programs  7 (1,4 %) 
N  505 (100 %) 
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Table 9. The degree of overlap between technology programs, sub-sample of subsidized firms 
 
Combinations of technology 
programs used by firms 
Frequency and percentage of firms using the actual 
combination of technology program(s).  
Only EU  14 (2, 8 %) 
Only SND  169 (33, 4 %) 
Only Ministry  45 (8, 9 % ) 
Only NFR  118 (23, 3 %) 
Only FUNN  63 (12, 5 %) 
SND & FUNN  5 (1, 1 %) 
FUNN & Ministry   1 (0, 2 %) 
Ministry & NRC  9 (1, 9 %) 
EU & NRC  14 (2, 7 %) 
FUNN & NRC  14 (2, 7 %) 
EU & FUNN  5 (1 %) 
SND & Ministry  9 (1, 9 %) 
SND & NFR  11 (2, 3 %) 
EU & Ministry  3 (0, 6 %) 
FUNN, EU & NRC  5 (1 %) 
SND, FUNN & NRC   3 (0, 6 %) 
EU, Ministry & NRC  2 (0, 4 %) 
FUNN, Ministry & NRC  3 (0, 6 %) 
SND, Ministry, & NRC  1 (0, 2 %) 
EU, SND & NRC  3 (0, 6 %) 
EU, SND, FUNN & NRC  2 (0, 4 %) 
EU, FUNN, Ministry & NRC  1 (0, 2 %) 
SND, FUNN, Ministry & NRC  4 (0, 8 %) 
Total  505 (100 %) 
Source: Own calculation based upon weighted R&D survey data for 2001 (data discussed below). 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics 
  Non-subsidized firms  Subsidized firms 
  Mean   Std.dev  Mean   Std.dev 
Age 0-5  0,11  0,32  0,09  0,29 
Age 6-10  0,23  0,42  0,23  0,42 
Age 11-20  0,35  0,47  0,35  0,48 
Age 21-50  0,23  0,42  0,26  0,44 
Age 50+  0,08  0,26  0,07  0,26 
Size 0-10  0,14  0,35  0,08  0,27 
Size 11-50  0,45  0,5  0,36  0,48 
Size 51-100  0,19  0,4  0,17  0,37 
Size 101-300  0,14  0,34  0,18  0,38 
Size 301-500  0,03  0,27  0,07  0,25 
Size 500 +  0,04  0,2  0,14  0,35 
Group 0,61  0,49  0,72  0,26 
Patent 0,11  0,32  0,4  0,49 
Export activity  0,13  0,26  0,3  0,34 
Diversification 0,31  0,46  0,32  0,47 
Foreign ownership  0,14  0,35  0,14  0,34 
Growth 3  46,1  0,3  2,2 
NRC subsidy (binary)  -  -  0,4  0,5 
SND (binary)  -  -  0,35  0,48 
Ministry subsidy (binary)  -  -  0,16  0,37 
EU subsidy (binary)  -  -  0,14  0,34 
FUNN subsidy (binary)  -  -  0,28  0,45 
  N = 3342    N = 291   
Source: Own calculation based upon weighted R&D survey data for 2001 (data discussed below). 
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Table 11. Determinants of getting access to a NRC subsidy 
Variables Beta  Std.  err  Odds 
ratio 
Size 0-10  -2,0877
***  0,605502 0,123972 
Size 11-50  -1,68226
***  0,364792 0,185954 
Size 51-100  -1,90992
***  0,390963 0,148092 
Size101-300 -1,27353
***  0,34027 0,279841 
Size 301-500  -0,90337
**  0,427627 0,405203 
Age 0-5  -0,01612  0,482296  0,984009 
Age 6-10  0,218701  0,392955  1,244459 
Age 11-20  0,074396  0,374029  1,077233 
Age 21-50  -0,00845  0,389693  0,991589 
Group 0,097152  0,27356  1,102028 
Patent 1,599101
***  0,235009 4,948581 
Export activity  0,621174
**  0,32218 1,861112 
Diversification -0,25545  0,259298  0,774565 
Foreign ownership  -0,25924  0,273093  0,771641 
Growth -0,39331  0,264789  0,674818 
Constant -2,25466  0,535553  0,104909 
R
2 = 0,22 / N = 
3633  
*** sig at the 0,01 level, ** sig at the 0,05 level and * sig at the 0,1 level 
 
Table 12. Determinants of getting a SND subsidy 
Variables Beta  Std.  err  Odds 
ratio 
Size 0-10  0,103846  0,55693  1,10943 
Size 11-50  -0,34117  0,486443  0,710938 
Size 51-100  -0,56519  0,497528  0,568253 
Size 101-300  -1,00807
**  0,533793 0,364924 
Size 301-500  -0,50103  0,664967  0,605907 
Age 0-5  0,494334  0,706125  1,639406 
Age 6-10  0,618934  0,641887  1,856947 
Age 11-20  0,77788  0,62084  2,176852 
Age 21-50  1,196828
**  0,622162 3,309603 
Group 0,510233
*  0,249761 1,665679 
Patent 1,031007
***  0,250504 2,803889 
Export activity  0,747663
**  0,335829 2,112059 
Diversification -0,48214
*  0,297362 0,617462 
Foreign ownership  -0,93443
**  0,391942 0,392811 
Growth -0,01958  0,028237  0,980612 
Constant -4,47165  0,781455  0,011428 
R
2 = 0,12 / N = 
3633  
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Table 13. Determinants of getting access to a Ministry subsidy 
Variables Beta  Std.  err  Odds 
ratio 
Size 0-10  -2,55878
***  0,902757 0,077399 
Size 11-50  -1,46663
***  0,500063 0,230702 
Size 51-100  -2,00379
**  0,601407 0,134824 
Size101-300 -1,22109
**  0,512157 0,294908 
Size 301-500  -1,30595
*  0,800445 0,270915 
Age 0-5  0,115587  0,735924  1,122532 
Age 6-10  0,543859  0,593315  1,722641 
Age 11-20  0,249604  0,590104  1,283516 
Age 21-50  -0,08705  0,637665  0,916634 
Group -0,04905  0,357305  0,952133 
Patent 0,47813  0,396453  1,613054 
Export activity  1,085068
**  0,497602 2,95964 
Diversification -0,1818 0,383877  0,833769 
Foreign ownership  -1,8624
**  0,745313 0,1553 
Growth -0,07733  0,161477  0,925587 
Constant -2,59259  0,765101  0,074826 
R
2 = 0,14 / N = 
3633  
*** sig at the 0,01 level, ** sig at the 0,05 level and * sig at the 0,1 level 
 
Table 14. Determinants of getting access to an EU subsidy 
Variables Beta  Std.  err  Odds 
ratio 
Size 0-10  -3,1551
***  1,206394 0,042634 
Size 11-50  -2,07148
***  0,56427 0,125999 
Size 51-100  -1,82772
***  0,564091 0,16078 
Size101-300 -1,87257
***  0,564869 0,153729 
Size 301-500  -1,21686
*  0,643047 0,296158 
Age 0-5  1,605094
*  0,872792 4,978326 
Age 6-10  0,982436  0,831779  2,670954 
Age 11-20  1,202154  0,799942  3,327278 
Age 21-50  0,435078  0,859807  1,545083 
Group -0,23468  0,500561  0,790821 
Patent 1,855309
***  0,408473 6,393677 
Export activity  1,132767
**  0,528508 3,104234 
Diversification -0,17194  0,417375  0,842034 
Foreign ownership  0,57272  0,388534  1,773083 
Growth -0,0559  0,154207  0,945636 
Constant -3,92841  1,007183  0,019675 
R
2 = 0,28 / N = 
3633      
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Table 15. Determinants of getting access to a FUNN subsidy 
Variables Beta  Std.  err  Odds 
ratio 
Size 0-10  -2,54367
***  0,727484 0,078578 
Size 11-50  -2,39518
***  0,474413 0,091156 
Size 51-100  -1,28577
***  0,41845 0,276437 
Size101-300 -0,77964
**  0,383842 0,458571 
Size 301-500  -0,28515  0,458445  0,751901 
Age 0-5  -0,49355  0,544008  0,610455 
Age 6-10  -0,03656  0,423655  0,964098 
Age 11-20  -0,32165  0,404343  0,724951 
Age 21-50  -0,05582  0,404388  0,94571 
Group -0,52312
*  0,310026 0,592668 
Patent 0,68851
***  0,267484 1,990746 
Export activity  1,200534
***  0,352745 3,32189 
Diversification -0,16582  0,284897  0,847194 
Foreign ownership  -0,08245  0,311436  0,920855 
Growth 9,64E-06  0,01154  1,00001 
Constant -2,50375  0,620342  0,081778 
R
2 = 0,22 / N = 
3633      
*** sig at the 0,01 level, ** sig at the 0,05 level and * sig at the 0,1 level 
 
Table 16. Determinants of getting access to more than one technology program 
Variables Coef.  Std.  err  Coef. Std.  err  Coef. Std.  err 
Size0-10 -.2858152
***  .0367231 -2.150151
***  .4104504 -1.567193
***  .2726597 
Size11-50 -.2684335
***  .0326471 -1.944462
***  .3217381 -1.382503
***  .185947 
Size51-100 -.2679384
***  .033074 -1.946301
***  .3307154 -1.333275
***  .1906079 
Size101-300 -.2368398
***  .0334333 -1.501134
***  .3155806 -1.042841
***  .178147 
Size301-500 -.1565692
***  .0445378 -.8969148
**  .402476 -.6472646
***  .2207772 
Age0-5  .0108469 .0314124  .2503539 .3799374  .0807701 .25482 
Age6-10  .0363652 .027799  .4685396 .3307795  .2425972 .2128456 
Age11-20  .027081  .0266946 .3020558  .3181355 .1662561  .2039449 
Age21-50  .0326029 .0276545  .4723552 .3258004  .2194241 .208415 
Group  -.0013394  .0153444 .0925524  .1827897 .0479585  .1353841 
Patent .2025154
***  .0205165 1.42256
***  .1949225 1.037911
***  .121266 
Export activity  .1431536
***  .0256303 1.032201
***  .2577549 .7994481
***  .1583639 
Diversification -.0257298  .0163629  -.3770871
**  .195912 -.2785728
**  .1313057 
Foreign ownership  -.0472282
**  .020277 -.6210739
***  .23455 -.3356597
**  .1454789 
Growth  -1.94e-06  .0001506  -.0242617 .025248 -.0260007 .0244447 
Constant  .3058334  .0410459 -2.209364  .4579672 -1.479007  .279217 
  N = 3633   OLS (R
2 = 0,09)  Tobit (R
2 = 0,11)  Poisson (R
2 = 0,15) 











Table A1. Factor loadings among binary R&D subsidies (rotated solution). 
Variables  Factor loadings  Factor loadings 
NRC subsidy (binary)  0,73  0,22 
EU subsidy (binary)  0,75  -0,01 
Ministry subsidy (binary)  0,15  0,66 
SND subsidy (binary)  -0,01  0,81 
FUNN subsidy (binary)  0,64  0,04 
Cumulative proportion of variance explained  33 %  53 % 
N = 3899  First factor  Second factor 
 
Table A2. Factor loadings among continuous R&D subsidies 
Variables  Factor loadings  Factor loadings 
Amount of NRC subsidy (log)  0,74  0,20 
Amount of EU subsidy (log)  0,76  0,04 
Amount of Ministry subsidy (log)  0,21  0,57 
Amount of SND subsidy (log)  -0,05  0,87 
Amount of FUNN subsidy (log)  0,61  0,04 
Cumulative proportion of variance explained  34 %  54 % 
N = 3899  First factor  Second factor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 